Children seem to have a natural tendency to imitate and their interest for particular kinds of imitative behaviour varies greatly with the infant's age. We argue that different forms of children's early imitation may be the result of an intrinsic motivation system driving the infant into situations of maximal learning progress. We present a computational model showing how an agent can learn to focus on "progress niches", situations neither completely predictable nor too difficult to predict given its anticipation capabilities. The existence of such a drive could explain why certain types of imitative behaviour are produced by children at a certain age, and how discriminations between self, others and objects gradually appear.
Introduction
The functional role of early imitation has been discussed in a variety of contexts. Its role for the cognitive development of the child has been regularly emphasized since Piaget [Piaget, 1962] . Its communicative function and its role for the development of social coordination know-how have also been put forward [Nadel, 2002] . Early imitative capabilities could also be important in the process of identification with others helping the very young infant to take a "like-me stance" [Meltzoff and Gopnick, 1993] . Eventually, it has been argued that infants also engage in "self-imitation" and that this process is crucial for the objectivation of themselves as distinct entities [Rochat, 2002] . This multiplicity of approaches points to a consensus that early imitation is a crucial basic mechanism for the development of cognitive, social, communicative aspects of children's behaviour and even more generally for the construction of their awareness about themselves, others and the external environment. Despite its importance, an important ques-tion regarding early imitation remain only partially answered: What pushes animals and infants to engage in imitative behaviour?
Early imitation seems to appear at an age when children do not discriminate clearly between themselves and others. It is argued that early imitation plays actually a role for identification with and discrimination from others. As a consequence, potential mechanisms for early imitation should not rely on the notions of self and others. In such conditions some authors have partially assimilated early identification as the result of very general mechanisms such as the "propensity of young organisms to repeat their own actions" [Rochat, 2002] , the homeostatic regulation of sensory-motor couplings [Andry et al., 2001] or a side-effect of particular neuronal dynamics [Oudeyer, 2005] . The common idea of all these approaches is that some general dynamics lead the infant into particular forms of imitative behaviour, explaining a "natural" tendency to imitate.
Would this mean that early imitation is the result of an automatic process? The existence of imitative reflexes associated with innate mappings between observation and execution is sometimes suggested. However, explanations must also account for certain contextual and "habituation" effects associated with early imitation:
(i) Early imitation is not an automatic response to a stimulus. "The infant must be altert, attentive and motivated to engage with another person" [Heimann, 2002] . That is to say, that in order to show early imitation the child must "want" to imitate. Where does such will-toimitate come from? (ii) The interest in imitation varies greatly with the infant's age: preverbal children enjoy imitative games whereas they avoid them once they master language [Nadel, 2002] . More generally, most kinds of imitative behaviour are typically transient phenomena: interesting for some time, boring when repeated too often.
Apart from sucking, crying and breathing which can be viewed as having a clear survival function, the explorative behaviour of young infants goes far beyond fixed-action patterns. The way they explore the possibilities of their own body movements and later on their propensity for discovering new aspects of their environment may be linked with a putative "pleasure" leading to such kind of open-ended development [Rochat, 2002] . Psychologists have argued that activities enjoyable for their own sake may be accounted for by the existence of an intrinsic psychobiological human motivation [White, 1959] . By contrast with extrinsically motivated types of behaviour directed towards the gain of external rewards, intrinsic moti-vation drives children and adults to engage in explorative and playful activities. The notion of instrinsic motivation can be historically linked to a long series of related concepts: drives for mastery like Herder's appetitus noscendi [Herder, 1772] , drives for novelty like Konrad Lorenz's neophily [Lorenz, 1968] , drives for knowledge like Dennett's epistemic hunger [Dennett, 1996] , situations in which skills and challenges are well-balanced such as Csikszentmihalyi's flow experiences [Csikszenthmihalyi, 1991] .
The concept of intrinsic motivation has recently received an increased attention from several research groups in the fields of artificial intelligence, machine learning and developmental robotics trying to design motivational systems for artificial agents enabling to learn in a task-independent manner. Such systems are designed in order to allow autonomous development, a very challenging issue for artificial systems [Weng et al., 2001] . As a result of these investigations, operant models of this notion of intrinsic motivation have been proposed. They consist in computational architectures the behavior of which can be tested through software simulations or robotic experiments. Such kinds of models permit to address the possible role of intrinsic motivation during the developmental processes in a more scientific manner.
The issue considered in the chapter is the following: Can we interpret early imitation phenomena, including self-imitation and simple interpersonal coordination, as being the result of a progress drive, an intrinsic motivation system driving the infant into situations expected to result in maximal learning progress? In order to investigate this hypothesis the next section introduces a computational model of what such a drive could be. A simple experiment illustrates how a progress-driven agent manages to adapt its behaviour in order to progress maximally in prediction. It shows how this agent performs an evaluation of learning progress for different kinds of sensorimotor interactions in order to focus on the most adapted ones at a given time of its development. This leads to an emergent organization of its behaviour based on self-evaluated predictability levels. Taking ground on these preliminary results, a scenario presenting the putative role of the progress drive for the development of imitation is discussed. We argue in particular that progress-driven learning could help understanding why children focus on specific imitative activities at a certain age and how they progressively organize preferential interactions with particular entities present in their environment.
Progress-driven learning
This section introduces progress-driven learning in a step-by-step manner. We discuss three kinds of architectures: mastery-driven systems, noveltydriven systems and progress-driven systems. All three systems are based on action selection strategies related to the agent's anticipatory capabilities. In mastery-driven systems, the agents acts in order to be in situations in which its error in prediction is minimal. On the contrary, in novelty-driven systems, the agent chooses actions leading to situations in which its error in prediction is maximal. Eventually, with progress-driven systems, it acts in order to be in situations in which its error in prediction decreases maximally fast. We will argue with a simple experiment that among these three closelyrelated architectures only progress-driven systems capture some aspects of the open-ended nature of children's development.
Progress-driven learning can be viewed as a particular form of reinforcement learning. In reinforcement learning models a controller chooses which action a to take in a context s based on rewards provided by a critic. Traditional models view the critic has being external to the agent. Such situations correspond to extrinsically motivated forms of learning. But the critic can as well be part of the agent itself (as clearly argued by Sutton and Barto [Sutton and Barto, 1998 ] p.51-54). As a consequence reinforcement learning is a well adapted framework to model intrinsic motivation [Barto et al., 2004] .
For our concerns, the main issue is to design a critic capable of producing internal rewards in order to guide the agent towards learning new skills. All the complex issues traditionally encountered in reinforcement learning like delayed rewards or trade-off between exploration and exploitation are also important for progress-driven learning. However, we will not address these questions in this chapter and only focus on the issue of designing a source of internal rewards suited for active and autonomous development.
Prediction and metaprediction
What unifies most of the models of intrinsic motivation proposed so far is that internal rewards are related to capabilities of the agent to anticipate the effects of its own action on the environment. We can formalize this kind of architecture in the following way. Let's call P , the prediction system responsible for anticipating the consequences y of the action a chosen among all the possible actions A and taken in a given state s in the state space S. Once the actual outcome y is known, the error e = y −y in prediction can be computed and used as a feedback to improve the performances of P . Another prediction system called metaP is responsible for predicting e, the error in prediction of Π. Taking also s and a as inputs, it makes a prediction e and compares it to the actual error e. It learns using the feedback signal δ = e − e (Figure 1 .1). No assumption is made regarding the kind of prediction devices that are used for P and metaP (neural networks, prototype-based predictors, support vector machines, etc.). Different techniques can be used for both systems. We consider the choice of a particular implementation as being part of a particular embodiment of the agent.
1.2.2 Mastery-driven systems For each state-action pair such a system is capable of predicting the outcome y as well as the expected error e about this prediction. This can serve as a basis for an internal reward signal. In mastery-driven systems the controller chooses actions corresponding to the minimum expected error. For this reason, mastery-driven systems are related to models which view homeostatis as a major drive for living creatures. Unpredicted situations may be seen as perturbations [Ashby, 1960 , Varela et al., 1991 for such a creature and learning as a way to reach again a form of equilibrium state (e.g. [Andry et al., 2001] ).
Novelty-driven systems
Taking an opposite point of view, other authors have suggested that in order to learn efficiently agents should focus on "novel", "surprising" or "unexpected" situations. This would mean that a "curious" agent should focus on situations for which it does not yet have adequate prediction capabilities (e.g [Huang and Weng, 2002 , Thrun, 1995 , Marshall et al., 2004 , Barto et al., 2004 ). Such a strategy can be realized by choosing the actions corresponding to the maximum expected error.
The "screen" problem
In order to compare mastery-driven systems and novelty-driven systems, we will consider a very simple experimental set up. At first glance, this toy . s is the current state, a a possible action, y the actual consequence of a, y' the predicted consequences of a, e the actual error in prediction, e the predicted error in prediction, δ the error on error prediction. problem seems unrelated with issues concerning early imitation. We will show in the next section how it nevertheless captures some important aspects of the problems we are considering in this chapter. The "screen" problem puts the agent in a situation where three different kinds of sensorimotor relations can be discovered. The first one is very easy to master, the second one is impossible to master and the third one can be learned with experience. The environment consists of a screen and four buttons. The agent must anticipate what it will see on the screen based on the current state of the pixels and the buttons which it presses. In this context, s(t) = y(t) is a 9 dimensional vector corresponding to the 9 pixels of the screen. y (t) is also a 9 dimensional vector corresponding to the prediction of s(t + 1). Each pixel can take the value 0 or 1 and a(t) is a 4 dimensional vector of binary values corresponding to the four buttons. Button 1, called "Noise" puts white noise on the screen when activated (values of pixels are set randomly to 0 or 1) and does nothing otherwise. Button 2, called "Reset" puts all the pixels to 0 when activated and does nothing otherwise. Button 3, called "Move+" increments a hidden variable pos when activated and does nothing otherwise. Button 4, called "Move-" decrements the same hidden variable when activated and does nothing otherwise. If Noise and Reset are both deactivated, the pixel corresponding to the value of pos is switched to 1 and all the others are switched to zero (see figure 1.2) †. As we mentioned, three situations are remarkable in terms of predictability. The most unpredictable situations happen when Noise is activated. The most predictable situations are obtained when all pixels are set to zero, that is when Noise is deactivated and Reset is activated. The interesting situation corresponding to the control of the "pos" pixel only happens when both Noise and Reset are deactivated. The desirable behaviour of an agent intrinsically motivated for learning should be to quickly discover that pressing the Reset button leads to an easily predictable situation, to avoid pressing the Noise button as no learning can take place in such a context and to focus on the "interesting" situation corresponding to the prediction of the screen values in the context where Noise and Reset are deactivated.
It is clear that neither mastery-driven systems nor novelty-driven systems will perform appropriately in this context. The first ones by trying to min- † When "Move+" is activated and pos corresponds to the last pixels then pos is set to correspond to the first pixel. In the same manner when "Move-" is activated and pos corresponds to the first pixels, pos is set to the last pixel. The effects of Reset are applied before the ones of Noise, which means that if both buttons are activated, pixels will take random values. Experiments start with all pixels set to 0 and pos equals 4.
imize the error in prediction will focus only on situations where Reset is pressed. The second ones in maximizing the error will be "trapped" by the noise channel, pressing constantly the Noise button. Both kinds of systems will miss the interesting thing to learn.
1.2.5 Progress-driven systems An alternative to maximizing or minimizing the error in prediction consists in maximizing learning progress. Learning progress may be defined in various ways. A straightforward definition is to associate progress with error reduction over time. A progress-driven system keeps track of the series of prediction errors {e}. With this list, it can compute the mean error < e(t) > for the last τ time steps. The learning progress p (t) can be defined by comparing the current average error with the average error θ time steps before. The action selection mechanism can consist in choosing actions that maximize the expected progress p'(t).
Several models have been proposed based on variations around this scheme and have proven to give adapted results in various contexts [Schmidhuber, 1991 , Herrmann et al., 2000 , Kaplan and Oudeyer, 2003 . However, they may not perform appropriately for the "screen" problem. In such a context, an oscillatory behaviour consisting in alternating between the easy and difficult situations is efficient for maximizing learning progress. By producing alternatively sequences where Noise is pressed followed by sequences where Reset is pressed, the agent experiences successive important decreases of its error in prediction. It is progressing in time but not relatively to the different sensorimotor situations present in the environment. In particular it does not focus on the interesting part of the problem, situations where both Noise and Reset are deactivated.
To avoid the risk of such oscillatory behaviour, learning progress must be evaluated by comparing the prediction errors corresponding to the same kind of situations and not the most recent situations. This can be achieved by a classification process T associating to each state-action pair, a class z corresponding to a particular partition of the state-action space. The progress must then be computed locally to this partition z by a specialized expert. Each expert consists in a predictor P z , a metapredictor metaP z specialized in only the partition z. To compute the local progress, each expert can monitor the evolution of its own error curve. Provided that the partition z groups similar state-action pairs, learning progress is evaluated in respect to prediction errors corresponding to the same kind of situations.
A possible way for constructing incrementally the classification process T and computing the local progress p z (t) for each partition is to build a tree of local experts. We designed an algorithm called Intelligent Adaptive Curiosity that can perform progress-driven learning using this method [Oudeyer and . In this algorithm, the tree is built by successively splitting the state space S and the action space A in different regions. This leads to a structure in which a single expert E z is assigned for each non-overlapping partition z created in the state-action space †.
Experimental results for the "screen problem"
We present results obtained in a typical experimental run ‡. In order to characterize the behaviour of the agent, we measured statistics on the value † Different criteria can be used to realize the splitting of the experts and the incremental construction of the tree. We will describe a particular one corresponding to the model used in the experiments presented in this chapter (see for another possible splitting method). The splitting method used is inspired by the marginal attribution mechanism described in [Drescher, 1991] . For the sake of simplicity we will describe the system in the case were s and a are vectors of binary values that can be either "on" or "off". Only small changes are necessary for the extension of this model to discrete and continuous values. Each expert Ez computes its average current error in prediction < ez(t) >. For each variable v of s and a, it also computes a set of finer statistics of the average prediction error in the cases where the variable is "on" or "off" : < ez(t) >v,on, < ez(t) > v,of f . We can define Rv,on(t) and R v,of f (t), respectively the reliability of prediction when v is on or off, and µ the marginal reliability ratio of v as :
At each time t, the system checks whether µv(t) (or 1/µv(t)) is superior to a threshold η significantly different from 1. This means that prediction is much better when the variable is either on or off. In such a case the expert Ez will be divided into two more specialized experts: one will only be applied to situations in which v is "on" and the other to situations in which v is off. The internal data of the prediction devices (weight of neurons, prototypes, etc.) are copied to both experts. The more general expert is destroyed so that the state-action space is divided into non overlapping zones. Just after the splitting, one expert is expected to be "better" than the other. But as both will adapt to their specialized context this situation may change. The system initially starts with a single predictor E 0 that can recursively divide itself into more specialized versions forming a tree of specialized experts. ‡ In this experiment the splitting threshold η was set to 1.3, the parameter for computing the error average and the progress are θ = τ = 150. The predictors used were Elman recurrent neural networks with 9 + 4 = 13 input neurons, 9 output neurons and 50 neurons in the hidden layer [Elman, 1990] .
of the Noise and Reset motor variables (we also measured them for Move+ and Move-but no particular patterns where found). Figure 1 .3 shows the evolution of the average values of these variables for a progress-driven agent. Three clearly distinct zones can be spotted. In a first phase, the agent shows no clear preference between activation or deactivation of the two buttons. Around iteration 700, its behaviour switches rapidly to a situation where mostly the case (NOISE OFF RESET ON) is explored. After iteration 1500, the agent switches behaviour again in order to explore the case (NOISE OFF RESET OFF) that corresponds to the learning of the control task with the two other buttons. Self-evaluation of learning progress permits an autonomous progressive scaling of the difficulty in the choice of the learning task. The agent learns first the simplest parts of its environment and focuses later, when the simple zones are well mastered, to more challenging learning situations. Sensorimotor relations too difficult to learn are ignored. Figure 1 .4 shows the structure of the tree of experts built during the experiment, underlying the observed behaviour. The system starts to make a distinction between situations when Noise is activated or deactivated. The noisy situations were then all directed to a specialized expert that did not divide anymore. The unnoisy branch was then rapidly divided into two branches: one for the very predictable case when (NOISE OFF RESET ON) and another for the remaining cases. No other divisions were then observed, even for much longer runs of these experiments.
"Progress niches"
We can introduce the notion of "progress niches" to characterize the behaviour of the model. The progress drive pushes the agent to discover and focus on situations which lead to maximal learning progress. These situations, neither too predictable nor too difficult to predict, are "progress niches". Progress niches are not intrinsic properties of the environment. They result from a relation between a particular environment, a particular embodiment (sensors, actuators, features detectors and techniques used by the prediction algorithms) and a particular time in the developmental history of the agent. Once discovered, progress niches progressively disappear as they become more predictable.
The concept of progress niches is related to Vygotsky's zone of proximal development, where the adult deliberately challenges the child's level of understanding. Adult push children to engage in activities beyond their current mastery level, but not too far beyond so that they remain comprehensible [Vygotsky, 1978] . We could interpret the zone of proximal development as what is and what is not a progress niche is ultimately defined from the child's point view.
Progress niches share also similarities with Csikszentmihalyi's flow experiences [Csikszenthmihalyi, 1991] . Csikszentmihalyi argues that some activities are autotelic when challenges are appropriately balanced with the skills required to cope with them (Luc Steels has suggested a way to operationalize this principle on an autonomous robot [Steels, 2004] ). We prefer to use the term progress niche by analogy with ecological niches as we refer to a transient state in the evolution of a complex "ecological" system involving the embodied agent and its environment.
Possible underlying developmental mechanisms for early imitation
The computational model of progress-driven development presented in this chapter shows how an agent can (1) separate its sensorimotor space into zones of different predictability levels and (2) choose to focus on the one which leads to maximal learning progress, called a "progress niche". This section discusses some speculations about the possible relevance of this motivational principle to explain the different kinds of imitative behaviour that successively appear during the first year of a child's life. It is argued that (1) the meaningful distinctions necessary for the development of imitation (self, others and objects in the environment) may be the result of discriminations constructed during a progress-driven process and that (2) imitative behaviour can more generally be understood as a way of producing actions in order to experience learning progress.
1.3.1 Neonates imitation (0m) Simple forms of imitative behaviour have been argued to be present just after birth. They could constitute a process of early identification. Some totally or partially nativist explanations could account for this early "likeme stance" [Meltzoff and Gopnick, 1993, Moore and Corkum, 1994] . This would suggest the possibility of an early distinction between persons and things.
If an intermodal mapping facilitating the match between what is seen and what is felt exists, the hypothesis of a progress drive would suggest that infants will indeed create a discrimination between such easily predictable couplings (interaction with peers) and unpredictable situations (all the other cases) and that they will focus on the first zone of their sensorimotor space Fig. 1 .5. Tree-like structure showing how the child could progressively organize its sensorimotor space into subbranches corresponding to self-centered interactions, interactions with peers and interactions with objects in the world. It could be argued that such discriminations are the result of significative differences in predictability levels that constitutes a "progress niche". Neonates imitation (when it occurs) would be the result of the exploitation of the most easiest predictable coupling present just after birth.
Self-imitation (1-2m)
During the first two months of their life, infants perform repeated body motion. They kick their legs repeatedly, they wave their arms. This process is sometimes referred as "body babbling". However, nothing indicates that this exploratory behaviour is randomly organised. Rochat argues that children are in fact performing self-imitation, trying to imitate themselves [Rochat, 2002] . This would mean that children are structuring their own behaviour in order to make it more predictable and form this way "circular reactions" [Baldwin, 1925 , Piaget, 1952 .
Such self-imitative behaviours can be well explained by the progress drive hypothesis. Sensorimotor trajectories directed towards the child's own body can be easily discriminated from trajectories directed towards other people by comparing their relative predictability difficulty. By many respects, making progress in understanding primary circular reactions is easier than in the cases involving other agents : Self-centered types of behaviour are "progress niches". In such a scenario the "self" emerges as a meaningful discrimination for achieving better predictability. Once this distinction is made, progress for predicting the effects of self-centered actions can be rapidly made.
Pseudo-imitation (2-4m)
After two months, infants become more attentive to the external world and particularly to people. Parental scaffolding plays a critical role for making the interaction with the child more predictable [Schaffer, 1977] . Parents adapt their own responses so that interactions with the child follow the normal social rules that characterize communicative exchanges (e.g. turn taking). Moreover, if an adult imitates an infant's own actions, it can trigger continued activity in the infant. This early imitative behaviour is referred as "pseudo-imitation" by Piaget [Piaget, 1962] .
Pseudo-imitation and focus on scaffolded adult behaviour are predictable effects of the progress drive. As the self-centered trajectories start to be well mastered (and do not constitute "progress niches" anymore), the child's focus shifts to another branch of the discrimination tree, the "self-other" zone.
Interaction with objects (5-7m)
After five months, attention shifts again from people to objects. Children gain increased control over the manipulation of some objects on which they discover "affordances" [Gibson, 1986] . Parents recognize this shift and initiate interactions about those affordant objects. However, children do not alternate easily their attention between the object and their caregiver.
A progress-driven process can account for this discrimination between affordant objects and unmastered aspects of the environment. Although this stage is typically not seen as imitative, it could be argued that the exploratory process involved in the discovery of the object affordances shares several common features with the one involved for self-imitation : the child structures its world looking for "progress niches".
Summary
It appears from this brief overview that several aspects of the development of imitative capabilities could be interpreted as a result of a progress-driven process. Figure 1 .5 shows a putative tree-like structure similar to the ones obtained with our computational model that could account for the progressive discrimination between self, others and other aspects of the environment. In such a context, early imitation can be seen as the result of a process by which an agent looks for "progress niches" by picking up easy to predict aspects of its environment, by engaging in scaffolded social interactions, by performing self-centered circular reactions and by discovering particular affordances of certain objects.
Conclusion
It has been argued that children are intrinsically motivated to imitate and that, at each stage of their developmental history, they engage in particular forms of imitative behaviour because they are inherently interesting or enjoyable. Our hypothesis states that different forms of children's early imitation may be the result of an intrinsic motivation system driving the infant into situations that are expected to lead to maximal learning progress. The existence of a progress drive could explain why certain types of imitative behaviour are produced by children at certain age and stop to be produced later on. It could also explain how discrimination between actions oriented towards the self, towards others and towards the environment may occur.
However, we do not claim that maximizing learning progress is the only motivational principle driving children's development. The complete picture is likely to include a complex set of drives. Developmental dynamics are certainly the result of the interplay between intrinsic and extrinsic forms of motivation, particular learning biases, as well as embodiment and environmental constraints. We believe that computational and robotic approaches can help specifying the contribution of these different components in the overall observed patterns and shed new lights on the particular role played by intrinsic motivation in these complex processes. [Vygotsky, 1978] 
